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CAN You HEAR ME Now? GOOD.TMI THE NEXTWA VE
OF OPTIONS FOR THE FCC, IN LIGHT OF FCC v.
NEXTWA VE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court made a clear announcement in
FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. when it correctly held
that the Bankruptcy Code prohibited the FCC from revoking licenses
held by a debtor upon the debtor's failure to make timely payments to
the FCC for purchase of the licenses.3  The Bankruptcy Code
methodically tries to balance the countervailing interests between
debtors and creditors.4 The Code encourages debtor companies that are
1. FEDTM 76364630. "Can You Hear Me Now? Good." is an active trademark of Cellco
Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless. FEDTM 76364630.
2. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003) (affirming judgment
declaring the spectrum license cancellations unlawful under bankruptcy provisions).
3. Id. The decision made it clear to government regulators not to make a payment default
the sole trigger for license cancellation. H. Jason Gold & Valerie P. Morrison, United States
Supreme Court Holds FCC in Violation of the Bankruptcy Code, available at
http://www.wrf.com/attorney/publications.asp?id=G432064236 (January 27, 2003).
4. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (as amended and codified in II USC) is commonly
known as the Bankruptcy Code. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 142 (7th ed. 1999). Bankruptcy is
defined as: "[t]he statutory procedure, usually triggered by insolvency, by which a person is relieved
of most debts and undergoes a judicially supervised reorganization or liquidation for the benefit of
that person's creditors." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 141 (7th ed. 1999). There are different types
of bankruptcy:
There are two general forms of bankruptcy: (1) liquidation and (2) rehabilitation.
Chapter 7 of the Code is entitled 'Liquidation.' . . . [i]n a typical Chapter 7 liquidation
case, the trustee collects the non-exempt property of the debtor, converts that property to
cash, and distributes the cash to the creditors... [c]hapters 11, 12, and 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code contemplate debtor rehabilitation. In a rehabilitation case, creditors
look to future earnings of the debtor, not to the property of the debtor at the time of the
initiation of the proceeding, to satisfy their claims. The debtor generally retains its assets
and makes payments to creditors, usually from postpetition earnings, pursuant to a court-
approved plan.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 141 (7th ed. 1999), quoting David G. Epstein et al., Bankruptcy § 1-5, at
8-9 (1993).
Chapter 11 is defined as "[t]he chapter of the Bankruptcy Code allowing an insolvent
business, or one that is threatened with insolvency, to reorganize itself under court supervision
while continuing its normal operations and restructuring its debt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 226
1
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reorganizing to make a "fresh start," while protecting creditors from
significant losses. 5 When a governmental agency, such as the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), is functioning as both a creditor
and regulator, a conflict arises between the agency's regulatory power
and its status as a creditor, thereby requiring it to abide by the
Bankruptcy Code.6
If the FCC takes action against a company that has filed for Chapter
11 protection, under its regulatory authority and for a regulatory
purpose, the Code yields to the regulatory agency.7 However, when the
FCC advances the government's pecuniary interests, the Bankruptcy
Code prevails, and the protections within the Code will be triggered to
prevent the government from negatively affecting the bankrupt
company.
8
This Note examines the competing interests involved when a
company has personal communications services (PCS) and spectrum
licenses granted by the FCC and reorganizes under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 9  Part II provides a framework of the FCC's
distribution of spectrum and PCS licenses, the relevant provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, an analysis of the FCC's actions as both a regulator
and creditor, and an overview of leading cases that have been decided in
this area.'0  Part III provides a statement of facts, including the
procedural history and the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v.
NextWave Personal Communications, Inc.I I Finally, Part IV analyzes the
impact of the Supreme Court's decision, and how it will affect future
regulatory action in the bankruptcy arena, along with proposed solutions
to the difficulties facing the FCC. 
12
(7th ed. 1999).
5. Andrea Serlin, NextWave v. FCC: Battle for the C-Block Licenses, 50 CATH. U. L. REV.
219, 229 (2000) (reviewing NextWave's position in trying to maintain C-Block licenses).
6. Nicholas J. Patterson, Symposium: Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation: Comment: The Nature and Scope of the FCC's Regulatory Power in the Wake of the
NextWave and GWI PCS Cases, 69 U. Cif. L. REV. 1373, 1373-74 (2002) (reviewing the FCC's
jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings, finding that the FCC can regulate use of the electromagnetic
spectrum by bankrupt licensees, but cannot enforce promissory notes against debtors in
bankruptcy).
7. Id. See infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text, for a full explanation of Chapter 11
Bankruptcy and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
8. See infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Parts II-iV.
10. See infra notes 13-59 and accompanying text.
It. See infra notes 60-107 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 108-199 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Communications Act of 193413 : The Process of Securing
PCS Licenses
The Federal Communications Act (FCA) established the FCC in
1934.14 In 1993, Congress amended the FCA to authorize the FCC to
award spectrum licenses "through a system of competitive bidding."
1 5
13. The Federal Communications Act (FCA) governs national telecommunications policy.
Nicole C. Daniel, A Return to Written Consent: A Proposal to the FCC to Eliminate Slamming, 49
FED. COMM. L.J. 227, 233 (1996) (recommending that the FCC reinstate its short-lived rule
requiring written authorization from the consumer before any change in the long-distance carrier
could be implemented). The FCC maintains regulatory power over interstate and foreign commerce
in communications by wire and radio. Id. The FCA requires the FCC to consider "the public
interest, convenience and necessity" when establishing rules. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 251 (h)(3)(not
in current version), 302(a)(repealed 1936), 303, and 309(a) (1995)). The FCC has two general sets
of functions. Id. First, it must establish and enforce fair rules of competition in communications.
Id. Second, it must "work in the public interest to protect consumers in noncompetitive
telecommunications markets and to guarantee public benefits from communications that a market
system simply will not provide." Id. (quoting Reform of Fed. Communications Commission:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the Comm. on Commerce
H.R., 104th Cong. 15 (1996) (statement of Reed E. Hundt)).
14. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996). See Federal
Communications Commission, About the FCC (last reviewed/updated June 3, 2003), at
http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html. The FCC is an independent United States government agency,
directly responsible to Congress. Id. It is charged with regulating interstate and international
communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. Id. The FCC's jurisdiction covers
the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. possessions. Id.
15. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §3090)(1) (1993). See Federal
Communications Commission, Glossary of TelecommunicationsTerms (last reviewed/updated July
31, 2002), at http://www.fcc.gov/glossary.html. The FCC defines 'spectrum' as, "the range of
electromagnetic radio frequencies used in the transmission of sound, data, and television." Id.
Congress directed the FCC to "promot[e] economic opportunity and competition" and
"avoid[] excessive concentration of licenses" by "disseminating licenses among a wide variety of
applications, including small businesses [and] rural telephone companies." Federal
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B). To achieve this goal, Congress directed the
FCC to "consider alternative payment schedules and methods of calculation, including lump sums
or guaranteed installment payments ... or other schedules or methods .... ." Federal
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(A). The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
regulates the use of radio spectrum to fulfill the communications needs of businesses, local and state
governments, public safety service providers, aircraft and ship operators, and individuals. Federal
Communications Commission, About the FCC, at http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html. Congress
directed the FCC to issue licenses in an auction system designed to promote the "efficient, fair, and
intensive use of the spectrum." Serlin, supra note 5, at 219. The licenses grant the licensee the
right to use the spectrum in accordance with the conditions accompanying the license. Id. at 225.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was the first major overhaul of telecommunications
law in almost 62 years, with the goal of allowing anyone to enter any communications business.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996); Federal
Communications Commission, Telecommunications Act of 1996 (last reviewed/updated November
2005]
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Pursuant to Congress's mandate, the FCC created a competitive bidding
auction system and designated the C-Block1 6 for small businesses
providing PCS, a new form of wireless technology. 7 The FCC had four
objectives in implementing the auctioning of the PCS licenses, which
focus on developing the technology and promoting opportunities for
small business. 
18
13, 2001), at http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html.
16. In 1993, Congress authorized competitive bidding to auction "blocks" of the
electromagnetic spectrum used for PCS. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)
(1993). The PCS spectrum was divided into six blocks, consisting of different available bandwidths
(MHz). Federal Communications Commission, FCC Broadband PCS Band Plan (last
reviewed/updated on September 23, 2003), at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/05. To further
Congress's purpose of promoting economic opportunity and competition, the FCC restricted
participation in C and F-Block auctions to small businesses and other designated entities with total
assets and revenues below certain levels, and allowed the successful bidders to pay in installments
over the term of the license. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. at 296. The FCC
structured the action under the assumption that the primary impediment to participation by small
businesses and minority or woman-owned firms was their lack of access to private capital markets.
Thomas W. Hazlett & Babette E.L. Boliek, Use of Designated Entity Preferences in Assigning
Wireless Licenses, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 639, 641 (1999) (identifying the delays in license allocation
that are directly associated with the FCC preference programs for small, woman, and minority-
owned businesses; estimating the consumer costs associated with those delays). Implementing the
directives of § 309(j)(1), the FCC reserved the C and F-Blocks of the PCS spectrum for small
businesses, entrepreneurs, and other "designated entities." Id. at 641-42.
17. Federal Communications Commission, Glossary of Telecommunications Terms (last
reviewed/updated July 31, 2002), at http://www.fcc.gov/glossary.html. The FCC defines PCS as:
Any of several types of wireless, voice and/or data communications systems, typically
incorporating digital technology. PCS licenses are most often used to provide services
similar to advanced cellular mobile or paging services. However, PCS can also be used
to provide other wireless communications services, including services that allow people
to place and receive communications while away from their home or office, as well as
wireless communications to homes, office buildings and other fixed locations.
Id.
PCS generally encompasses a wide range of radio-based communications services that free
individuals from the constraints of the wireline public switched telephone network. Thomas A.
Monheim, Personal Communications Services: The Wireless Future of Telecommunications, 44
FED. COMM. L.J. 335, 338 (1992) (defining PCS and providing partial listing of then current PCS
experiments).
The FCC categorized designated entities by average revenues over the three years preceding
the filing for auction eligibility. Hazlett, supra note 16, at 641; see generally Implementation of
Section 3090) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding Narrowband PCS, Third
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 175, 75
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1211 (1994). The categories included very small business, for firms with
average revenues of $15 million; small business for those with revenues not in excess of $40
million; and entrepreneur, for those with revenues in excess of $40 million, and not in excess of
$125 million. Id. Entrepreneurs were to have no more than $500 million in gross assets. Id.
18. Serlin, supra note 5, at 227. Section 3096) of the FCA provided that the Commission
shall include safeguards to protect the public interest and the following four objectives:
(A) development and rapid deployment of new technologies ... for the benefit of the
public.., without administrative or judicial delays; (B) promoting economic opportunity
[20:85
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To enable small businesses to effectively compete for PCS licenses,
Congress directed the FCC to auction specific blocks of the spectrum to
qualified small businesses and to offer flexible payment plans.' 9 An
inherent problem became apparent, however, as each auction covered
the same or similar geographical areas, and the bidders at the C-Block
auction were mainly new to the market and dramatically misjudged the
licenses values.20  The FCC implemented Restructuring Orders to allow
C-Block licensees to choose one of three options to ease the financial
burden.2'
and competition.., by disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants,
including small businesses... ; (C) recovery for the public of a portion of the value of
the public spectrum resource ... ; and (D) efficient and intensive use of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
47 U.S.C. 309j)(3)(A)-(D).
19. Serlin, supra note 5, at 235. The C-Block auctions resulted in bids that aggregated $10.2
billion in May and July of 1996. Id. The FCC required a ten percent cash down payment of the bid,
and the remaining ninety percent was deferred in installments spanning ten years. Id. at 235-36.
The C-Block auction began on December 18, 1995 and ended on May 6, 1996. Federal
Communications Commission, Auction 5: Broadband PCS C Block (last reviewed/updated on
September 23, 2003), at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/05. There were a total of 184 rounds of
bidding. Id. A total of 225 bidders were qualified for the auction, and 89 small business bidders
won 493 licenses. Id.
20. Serlin, supra note 5, at 235-36. After the C-Block auctions, the FCC announced
additional auctions in the D, E, and F Blocks, which covered many of the same geographical areas
as the C-Block licenses already auctioned. Id. at 236. The final bids on these later blocks were
significantly lower, and the decrease was not attributed to a decrease in the value of the PCS market,
but to the extremely high bids in the C-Block auction. Id. This inflated bidding was attributed to
the inexperience of the C-Block bidders, as they were mainly new to the market. Id. at 265 n.94.
The FCC suspended C-Block licensees' installment payment deadlines because several companies
sought to modify their payments. Id. at 237. Many of the high bidders in the C-Block auctions
were not able to obtain financing because the investment banking community believed that the cost
of the C-Block licenses was "grossly excessive" compared to their market value, considering the
lower winning bids of the D, E, and F Block auctions. Id. at 265 n.95.
21. Serlin, supra note 5, at 237. The options consisted of: (1) disaggregation and return of
one half of the licensees' spectrum to the FCC for re-auction; (2) amnesty in the form of debt
forgiveness in exchange for all of the licenses; and (3) prepayment. Installment Payment Financing
for Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licenses, 62 Fed. Reg. 55354 (Oct. 24, 1997) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 1 and 24). The C-Block licensees also had the option to resume payments
under their current note. Id. at 55350. The disaggregation option allowed any C-Block licensee to
break up a portion of its spectrum from each of its licenses and surrender it to the FCC for
reauction. Id. The only requirements were that the licensee had to disaggregate 15 MHz of
spectrum it held across all Basic Trading Areas (BTAs) in a Major Trading Area (MTA). id. The
FCC required this to prevent selective surrendering for which the licensee believed it paid too much
for, or otherwise discarding spectrum in markets more difficult to serve. Id. The FCC also
provided that to avoid unjust enrichment, licensees were prohibited from bidding in the subsequent
reauction for spectrum the incumbent licensee had disaggregated. Id. The amnesty option
permitted any C-Block licensee to surrender all of its licenses in exchange for relief from its
outstanding debt and waiver of any applicable default payment. Id. at 55351. The FCC adopted the
amnesty option to speed use of the C-Block spectrum to provide service to the American public. Id.
2005]
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The process to obtain a PCS license begins with the FCC
announcing an auction in an official public notice.22 The FCC may
require an upfront payment from those choosing to participate in an
auction in order to ensure that only serious bidders participate.23 If a
participant has a winning bid, it is not automatically granted a license.24
The winning bid only grants the exclusive right to apply for the license.
25
After submitting necessary information, the FCC evaluates the winning
bidder's application and either grants or denies the license application. 26
B. The Bankruptcy Code
27
The Bankruptcy Code is structured to permit a debtor "to carry on
and rebuild his life" by making a "fresh start," and protects creditors
from significant losses by an insolvent debtor.28 Determining what
The FCC acknowledged that it would not return the down payments made by licensees electing the
amnesty option, to discourage speculation and ensure that all bidders would participate in the
reauction without undue advantage. Id. Prepayment allowed any C-Block licensee to prepay
selective licenses subject to certain restrictions. Id. at 55352.
22. Serlin, supra note 5, at 228. The notice specifies the geographic spectrum and the
guidelines for the application. Id. The notice also includes the following information: the licenses
to be auctioned, along with the time, place, and method of competitive bidding to be used, the bid
submission and withdrawal procedures, filing timelines for forms, fees, and payments. Id. at 265
n.49. Bidders must submit an application and certification forms which identify the licenses for
which the applicant seeks to bid, the applicant's name, certification that applicant is qualified under
Section 308(b) of the FCA, and a certification of meeting any financial requirements. Id.
23. Id. at 228. The FCC is authorized to provide upfront and/or down payments under
Section 3090)(4). Id. at 265 n.50.
24. Id. at 228. The winning bidder must submit a long-form application and a non-refundable
down payment, which is a certain percentage of its total bid. Id. at 228, 265 n.52.
25. Id. at 228. The highest bidders are announced in a public notice, and parties opposed to a
granting of an application can provide specific allegations as to why it would be inconsistent with
public interest. Id. at 228-29.
26. Id. at 229. If the FCC grants an application, it awards the license on full payment of the
winning bid. Id.
27. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
28. Serlin, supra note 5, at 229. The Code is a detailed and complicated set of regulations,
with the public policy of giving debtors a second chance at success. Miriam Marton, The Battle of
Authority Between the FCC and the Bankruptcy Courts, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 81, 96 (2001)
(discussing the case history of FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Include, emphasizing
the need of the Supreme Court to make a determinative decision as to which prevailed). Chapter 11
is a rehabilitative clause, where "creditors look to future earnings of the debtor, not to the property
of the debtor at the time of the initiation of the bankruptcy proceeding, to satisfy their claims." Id.
(quoting David G. Epstein et al., Bankruptcy § 1-5, at 10 (1992)). The policy prevents liquidation of
the debtor's assets, and permits successful rehabilitation. Serlin, supra note 5, at 265 n.58.
Bankruptcy law seeks to accomplish three goals: (1) to distribute equitably the debtor's assets
among creditors; (2) relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, to permit
the debtor a fresh start; and (3) expeditious and economic administrative of cases under the
Bankruptcy Code. Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 20 P.3d 868, 871-72 (Utah 2000).
[20:85
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property is included in the bankruptcy estate is critical, and such
property includes "[a]ll interests of the debtor... as of the
commencement of the case" and that which "the estate acquires after the
commencement of the case.",29  The Code protects both debtors and
creditors.3 °
29. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). Property includes, among other things: bank accounts, checks,
insurance owned by debtor, land sale contracts, leased property, accounts receivable, assets of a
corporation in which debtor is a shareholder, cars, community property, crops, escrow funds, stock
exchange seats, licenses and permits, livestock, marital property, or obligations such as alimony,
and various personal property. Serlin, supra note 5, at 265 n.61. The companies that obtain
licenses from the FCC have property rights in their licenses. William L. Fishman, Property Rights,
Reliance, and Retroactivity Under the Communications Act of 1934, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 6
(1997).
Licensees' property rights in their licenses are often disputed in the bankruptcy context. Id.
at 21. The licenses obtained from the FCC are generally among the more valuable assets of a
licensee, and questions arise as to whether bankruptcy courts can assert dominion over the licenses
as it would over other bankruptcy estate assets. Id. at 22. Some bankruptcy courts have treated an
FCC license as "property of the estate" under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, however others
have taken the contrary view. Id. See, e.g., In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 124 BR. 426, 430 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co., 35 B.R. 400, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983)
(holding that FCC license is not property of debtor's estate).
A bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over a debtor's licenses rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e),
where a bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over all property of the debtor. Rafael Pardo,
Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction and Agency Action: Resolving the NextWave of Conflict, 76 N.Y.U.
L. R -v 945, 956 (2001) (criticizing decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which held that bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to determine if the FCC is stayed from
revoking a debtor's licenses). The only way a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over the licenses is
if the PCS licenses are considered property of the estate, as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Id. at
956-57. Within the bankruptcy context, the degree of property interest a debtor holds in PCS
licenses is sufficient to trigger a bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction over licenses as property
of the estate. Id. at 957.
30. Serlin, supra note 5, at 230. The debtor's property interest is protected by staying any
action against the estate, suspending debts owed to creditors, and either modifying payments or
granting total or partial avoidance of debts. Id. Creditors are protected, even if the estate is not
large enough to cover all debts fully, by fairly distributing the debtor's property to satisfy the
creditors' claims. Id. The automatic stay provision is one of the basic debtor protections within the
Code. Id Section 362(a) stays debt collection efforts, foreclosures, and actions to possess or
control property of the estate. II U.S.C. § 362(a). This helps to preserve maximum value of the
assets for the benefit of both the debtor and its creditors. Serlin, supra note 5, at 231. The stay is
applied to all parties involved in the proceedings, to give the debtor a break from his creditors, and
to design a reorganization plan that will successfully pull the debtor out of bankruptcy. Marton,
supra note 28, at 96. The automatic stay puts all creditors on equal footing, so there is no disparity
because of the relative power of each creditor. Id. There are exceptions to the automatic stay
provision, such as for regulatory powers of govermental agencies, but they are to be read narrowly
in conjunction with Congress's intent to provide broad relief with the stay. Id. at 96-97.
2005]
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1. Section 525 (a)3 1 Protection Against Discriminatory Treatment
Section 525 (a) of the Code was enacted to codify and expand the
Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Perez v. Campbell.32 Section 525 (a)
prevents any governmental unit, as defined in the Code, from revoking,
suspending, denying or refusing to renew, or discriminating in any way
with respect to, a government license, permit, employment or "other
similar grant" to a debtor or former debtor or its affiliates "solely
because" the debtor is or was in bankruptcy, was insolvent before it was
adjudged a bankrupt, or did not pay a debt dischargeable in the
bankruptcy case. 3  The section furthers the "fresh start" policy
underlying the Code.34
31. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (a) in relevant part provides:
a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license.., or
other similar grant to,. . . discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny
employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to
employment against, a person that is... a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy
Act... solely because such bankrupt or debtor ... has not paid a debt that is
dischargeable in the case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy
Act.
11 U.S.C. § 525(a).
32. The legislative history reflects that § 525(a) was designed to codify the Supreme Court's
decision in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). See S. Rep. No. 95-989 at 81 (1978); H.R.
Rep. No. 95-595 at 165 (1977). Perez involved an Arizona statute that called for suspending the
driver's license of any motorist who failed to pay an automobile tort judgment, even one that had
been discharged in bankruptcy. Perez, 402 U.S. at 638-39. The Court held that application of the
statute in that context unconstitutionally treaded on federal bankruptcy laws. Id. at 652.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a). A governmental unit is defined as:
United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state;
department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States
trustee while serving as a trustee in a case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a
District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic
government.
11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (2003); see I 1 U.S.C. § 525(a).
34. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S at 307 n.4 (stating that it would
undermine the debtor's "fresh start" "if there [was a] revocation of a license solely because of a
bankrupt's failure to pay dischargeable debts").
[20:85
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2. Section 362 (a) Automatic Stay35
The automatic stay provision is one of the most important debtor
protections; however, governmental agencies acting within regulatory
context are exempt from the provision.36 The courts have used two tests,
the "pecuniary purpose" 37 test and the "public policy '38 test, to
determine if a regulatory agency qualifies for the exception from the
automatic stay.
39
In a bankruptcy proceeding, a debtor can seek to avoid the full or
35. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) in relevant part provides:
a petition filed... or an application filed... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,
of... (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; (5)
any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent
that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case.
11 U.S.C. §362(a). The automatic stay was designed to prevent certain creditors from gaining
preference for their claims against the debtor, to forestall development of debtor's assets due to
legal costs in defending proceedings against interest, and to avoid interference with orderly
liquidation or rehabilitation of the debtor. Borman v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 946 F.2d 1031, 36
(3d Cir. 1991).
36. 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(4); Serlin, supra note 5, at 232. The stay is automatic and immediate,
with no judicial action required. Pardo, supra note 29, at 947. Section 362(b)(4) indicates that the
stay does not apply to affect the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce the governmental unit's police or regulatory power. 11 U.S.C. § 362
Legislative Statements. This section is intended to be given a narrow construction to permit
governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not to apply to
actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or property
of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 362 Legislative Statements. The exemption for the automatic stay in cases
of government regulatory action is a result of the "countervailing policy favoring state control of
natural resources." Serlin, supra note 5, at 232. The action of the government must involve
regulatory enforcement, and must not be used to advanced the government's pecuniary interests. Id.
Government regulatory actions unaffected by the stay include: fraud prevention, environmental
protection, consumer protection, and actions to protect public health and safety. Pardo, supra note
29, at 950. The legislative history has indicated that the exceptions should not be applied to except
agency actions whose aim is to "protect a pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or property of
the estate." Id.
37. Pardo, supra note 29, at 950. The "pecuniary purpose" test asks if the government's
action "relates primarily to the protection of the government's pecuniary interest in the debtor's
property and not to matters of public policy." Id. (quoting Eddleman v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 923
F.2d 782, 791 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that Department of Labor's enforcement proceedings are
except from stay under either test)). Under the "pecuniary purpose" test, a regulatory agency will
not be excepted if is primarily seeks to protect a pecuniary interest. Id.
38. Id. The "public policy" test asks if the government's action against the debtor seeks to
effectuate public policy or to adjudicate private rights. Id. (quoting Eddleman, 923 F.2d at 791). If
the government is attempting to advance private rights it will not be excepted from the stay. Id.
39. Id. at 950-51. The courts appreciate that the regulatory power exception reflects
Congress's desire to ensure that the Bankruptcy Code will not interfere with local, state, or federal
governments implementing their respective regulatory schemes, however, the courts have
interpreted both tests that the exception should not be read to give an agency free rein over a
debtor's assets simply because the agency claims to act within its regulatory authority. Id.
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partial payment of a debt by trying to prove that the obligation resulted
40from a fraudulent conveyance.
C. Regulator or Creditor?
The FCC plays two roles in dealing with parties licensed to use the
electromagnetic spectrum of the United States.41 The FCC was created
to be a regulator with control of the spectrum.42 Congress enabled the
FCC to become a creditor, by authorizing the FCC to conduct
competitive auctions for electromagnetic licenses.43  "When a licensee
goes bankrupt, tension arises if the FCC tries to use its position as a
regulator to give it an advantage as a creditor."
4
Only the circuit courts of appeals have jurisdiction over the FCC
with regard to its regulatory capacity, while the Code gives the district
courts original jurisdiction of proceedings under Title 1 1 and. all related
matters.45 A jurisdictional dispute arises when a debtor in a bankruptcy
proceeding alleges that a government regulatory agency violated the
automatic stay provision. 6
40. Serlin, supra note 5, at 231. A fraudulent conveyance claim is a bankruptcy action by
which a debtor can obtain relief from debts that the bankruptcy court determines were invalid at the
time they were incurred. Id. at 265 n.19. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548(a)(2)(A) (2000). The debtor
must prove that he incurred the obligation when his remaining assets were unreasonably small
compared to the transaction, and the transaction did not provide him a reasonably equivalent value.
Serlin, supra note 5, at 231. Bankruptcy courts faced with a fraudulent conveyance claim must
ultimately determine the value of the asset in controversy. Id.
41. Patterson, supra note 6, at 1373.
42. Id. As a regulator, the FCC allocates licenses for use of the spectrum and oversees
licensees' use of these licenses in order to prevent interference. Id. See also 47 U.S.C. § 307(a)(1)
(1994).
43. See Id. See also 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (authorizing the FCC to sell
electromagnetic licenses for PCS to private companies by auction and specifying the design of such
bidding and the governmental objectives auctions should seek to promote).
44. Patterson, supra note 6, at 1374.
45. Marton, supra note 28, at 84. A bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over a debtor's assets
rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1994) (providing "the district court in which a
case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the
property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of
the estate"). District courts have "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings
arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
46. Pardo, supra note 29, at 960-61. The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over
any challenge to the validity of a final order of the FCC. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) (providing in pertinent part, "[t]he court of appeals ... has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set
aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of... all final orders of the Federal
Communications Commission made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47"); 47 U.S.C. § 402(a)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing, in pertinent part, "[any proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul,
or suspend any order of the Commission under this chapter... shall be brought as provided by and
in the manner prescribed in chapter 158 of Title 28"). The district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
[20:85
10
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 20 [2005], Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol20/iss1/4
FCC V. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUMICATIONS, INC.
D. Other Cases
1. In re Personal Communications Network, Inc.47
The facts of In re Personal Communications Network, Inc., are very
similar to those in Next Wave.48 The court deferred to the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and found that
the bankruptcy court was "without power to review the propriety of the
FCC's conclusion that the... [l]icenses were revoked automatically
upon [d]ebtor's failure to meet conditions imposed by the FCC for
retention of the [l]icenses. ' 49 The court concluded that since the FCC
determined that the licenses automatically cancelled, then the licenses
were not property of the estate under Section 541.50
over all property of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(e); Marton, supra note 28, at 84.
47. 249 B.R. 233 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting motion by the United States to determine
that debtor's PCS licenses were not a part of debtor's estate). The Eastern District court of New
York held it had no jurisdiction to review the FCC's decisions. Id. at 237.
48. In re Pers. Communications Network, Inc., 249 B.R. at 235-37. PCN submitted bids for
six C-Block licenses, and was subsequently awarded the six licenses in 1996. Id. at 235. PCN
completed its down payments in September 1996, and issued promissory notes for the balance due.
/.hi
• 
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Block licensees were having in meeting their payment obligations. Id. PCN opted to give up its
rights to use half of the spectrum covered by the six licenses to reduce their payment obligation in
half. Id. Each license contained the following language in relevant part: "authorization conditioned
upon the full and timely payment of all monies due ... failure to comply with the condition will
result in automatic cancellation of this authorization." Id. at 236. This is the same condition set on
NextWave's authorization. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S at 297.
49. See id See also In re Pers. Communications Network, Inc., 249 B.R. at 237; In re FCC,
217 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2000) (granting writ of mandamus to the bankruptcy court, concerning a
bankruptcy court order prohibiting the FCC from re-auctioning spectrum licenses previously held
by debtor, finding the bankruptcy court's ruling violated the court's mandate, and that the FCC's
licensing decisions were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals and
outside the limited jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. The court found that the FCC's decision to
re-auction debtor's PCS licenses was in fact regulatory and directed the bankruptcy court to vacate
its earlier order). The court found that the federal courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over
the FCC's licensing decisions and are outside the limited jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. In re
Pers. Communications Network, Inc., 249 B.R. at 236-37.
50. In re Pers. Communications Network, Inc., 249 B.R. at 237. The court rejected the
debtor's argument that the automatic cancellation of the licenses violated due process rights. Id.
2005]
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2. In re GWI PCS 1, Inc. 51
The facts of In re G WI PCS 1 Inc. were nearly identical to those in
NextWave with the exception that the court in GWI determined that the
company had begun implementing its reorganization plan.52 An analysis
of the requirements of equitable mootness 53 demonstrate that "the court
stretched its reasoning to show compliance with substantial
consummation., 54  The court ultimately conceded that the FCC's
jurisdiction trumped the bankruptcy court.55  However, the court
51. 230 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming debtors' bankruptcy reorganization plan allowing
for the avoidance of $894,000,000 of debtors' obligation to FCC and providing for the subsidiary
debtors retention of licenses obtained at FCC auction on finding the obligation was a constructive
fraudulent transfer and the FCC's contentions were equitably moot).
52. In re GWI PCS 1, Inc., 230 F.3d at 802. The court determined that although it "might
agree with the Second Circuit and reverse the bankruptcy court's avoidance judgment," it was
precluded from doing so by "equitable mootness." Id. at 805. Reorganization within bankruptcy is
defined as "a financial restructuring of a corporation, especially in the repayment of debts, under a
plan created by a trustee and approved by a court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1300 (7th ed.
1999). The Chapter II reorganization provisions enable a business debtor to achieve a complex and
comprehensive financial restructuring through the workings of a plan of reorganization that
provides for distribution on, and discharge of, all of the debtor's pre-bankruptcy debts. Ralph
Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor
Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 959, 961 (1997).
53. The mootness doctrine is defined as "[t]he principle that American courts will not decide
moot cases - that is, cases in which there is no longer any actual controversy." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1025 (7th ed. 1999).
54. Marton, supra note 28, at 101. Equitable mootness is a recognition by the appellate courts
that there is a point beyond which they cannot order fundamental changes in reorganization actions.
In re GWI PCS 1, Inc., 230 F.3d at 800. The courts consider three elements when deciding if
equitable mootness applies: (1) if a stay has been obtained; (2) if the plan has been substantially
consummated; and (3) if the relief requested would affect either the rights of parties not before the
court or the success of the plan. Id. A stay had been issued in this case which was lifted, and the
FCC made no further actions to reinstate the stay. Id. Without a stay in place, the reorganization
plan became effective. Id. at 801. Substantial consummation is defined as:
(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan to be
transferred; (B) assumption by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the plan
of the business or of the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with
by the plan; and (C) commencement of distribution under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1101(2); In re GWI PCS 1, Inc., 230 F.3d at 801.
The court found that although the company had a "Business Alternative" and a "Litigation
Alternative," that a "number of transactions [were] completed in furtherance of the Business
Alternative." Id. at 802. The final element was satisfied because the court was concerned with the
possible effect on third parties of reversing the implementation of the reorganization plan. Id. at
803.
55. In re GWI PCS 1, Inc., 230 F.3d at 804. "Although the bankruptcy court possibly erred
in permitting avoidance and enjoining the FCC from revoking the subsidiary debtors' licenses for
failing to remit the full bid price,... the FCC's challenge on this point and request that the
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distinguished this case from the Second Circuit's decision in NextWave
as the company in the instant case had already "substantially
consummated" a reorganization plan, while NextWave had not.
56
3. U.S. v. Kansas Personal Communications Services, Ltd.57
The Kansas federal district court dealt with a debtor similarly
situated to NextWave and agreed with the NextWave decision by the
District Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, finding that the
cancellation of the licenses was automatic upon default in payment.
58
The district court determined that the FCC held the position of a
regulatory agency in this case, not a creditor.
59
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
At C-Block auctions in May and July, 1996, NextWave Personal
Communications, Inc., and NextWave Power Partners, Inc. (jointly
referred to as NextWave) bid $4.74 billion in total, winning 63 C-Block
licenses.6° Consistent with the statutory mandate, the FCC enacted
regulations authorizing payment on outstanding balances owed to the
FCC over a period of ten years. 61 NextWave made a down payment on
56. Id.
57. 256 B.R. 807 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding "[i]t is not the role of a court to second guess the
FCC's regulatory scheme and hold that the statutory objectives are not furthered by requiring timely
and full installment payments. Such a policy decision lies in the discretion of the FCC ... 
(citation omitted).
58. U.S. v. Kansas Pers. Communications Services, Ltd., 256 B.R. at 812. The court looked
to similar cases to determine that the filing of a bankruptcy petition did not preserve the licensee's
limited property interest in a license under the automatic stay provision. Id. at 812. The First
Circuit upheld an FAA regulation providing that an airline's right to use airport departure slots
"shall be recalled by the FAA" upon failure of the airline to use the slots for a two month period. In
re Gull Air, Inc., 890 F.2d 1255, 1260 (1st Cir. 1989). The court concluded that there was no need
for affirmative action by the FAA, and held the automatic stay inapplicable. Id. at 1263.
59. Kansas Pers. Communications Services, 256 B.R. at 814.
60. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2001) aff'd,
537 U.S. 293 (2003) (concluding that the FCC had violated 11 U.S.C.S. § 525(a), which prohibits
governmental entities from revoking debtors' licenses solely for failure to pay dischargeable debts,
and the FCC was bound by the usual rules governing the treatment of such obligations in
bankruptcy). In 1995, a group of former telecommunications executives founded NextWave
Personal Communications Inc. and NextWave Power Partners Inc. for the purpose of bidding on
PCS licenses and operating a personal communications service. Id. The founders hoped the
company would become a "carrier's carrier," selling wireless services and airtime wholesale. Id.
61. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 235 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
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the purchase price, signed promissory notes for the balance, and
executed security agreements.
62
"On June 26, 1996, the FCC announced the date for
commencement of the D, E and F Block auctions, which were held on
August 26, 1996 and concluded in January 1997. ,63 The value of the
winning bids on the D, E and F Block auctions were a fraction of those
in the C-Block auction.64 The disparity between the C-Blocks and the D,
E and F Blocks which covered geographical areas covered by the C-
Blocks caused several successful C-Block bidders, including NextWave,
to experience difficulty obtaining financing.65
Approval for NextWave's 63 C-Block licenses came through on
1998) (ruling court had no jurisdiction over the unfair conduct claim as the claim was based on
defendant's conduct acting in its regulatory capacity and required the court to attach legal
consequences to conduct within defendant's regulatory capacity under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1334, over
which the court had no jurisdiction; also finding the court had jurisdiction over the fraudulent
conveyance claim, which pertained to certain transfers, as it arose solely out of defendant's status as
a creditor, implicated no conduct by defendant, did not require the court to adjudicate or attach any
consequence to any act or omission of defendant in its regulatory capacity, and defendant was not
given authority to dictate its own rights as a creditor). The regulations required a 10 percent down
payment, and the remaining 90 percent paid over ten years, with interest only for the first six years
and principal and interest for the remaining four years. Id. Below-market interest rates were
provided to enable start up companies to obtain financing through capital markets or private
placement. Id.
62. Id. The company made the 10 percent required down payment totaling $474 million. Id.
The security agreements gave the FCC a first "lien on and continuing security interest in all of the
Debtor's rights and interest in [each] License." NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 254 F.3d at
134. The licenses were conditional on "the full and timely payment of all monies due pursuant
to... the [FCC's] installment plan as set forth in the Note and Security Agreement executed by the
licensee." Id. Failure to comply with the condition would result in automatic cancellation of the
license. Id.
63. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. at 266. These blocks covered
geographical areas across the country, including areas covered by the 63 C-block licenses for which
NextWave was awaiting FCC approval. Id. at 266-67.
64. Id. at 267. Factors in the value of PCS licenses are: the population or number of people
served by the license ("Pops"); the carrying capacity of the wireless spectrum covered by the
license, expressed in number of megahertz ("MHZ"). Id. The price paid for a license can be
quantified in terms of dollars per MHZ per Pops, or S/MHZ-Pops. Id. NextWave bid an average of
$1.43/MHZ-Pops for the 63 C-Block licenses for which it was high bidder. Id. However, the
winning bids for the D, E and F Block auctions reflected an average value of $.35/MHZ-Pops for D
and E Block and $.245/MHZ-Pops for F Block licenses. Id.
65. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. at 266.. The lower bids in the D, E, and
F Block auctions significantly drove down the value of the C-Block licenses to thirteen percent of
NextWave's bid price. Serlin, supra note 5, at 238. NextWave anticipated it would require $700
million in public financing to implement its business plan. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc.
v. FCC, 235 B.R. 277, 286 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that the licenses did not constitute a
"reasonably equivalent value" for debtor's $474 million cash down payment and promissory notes
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January 3, 1997.66 The FCC suspended installment payment obligations
for C-Block licensees, and issued two "Restructuring Orders," offering a
67Th FCvariety of revised financing options. The FCC gave licensees until
June 8, 1998 to elect a restructuring option, until July 31, 1998 to
resume installment payments, and October 29, 1998 as the last date it
would accept late installment payments.68 NextWave attempted to
obtain stays of the election deadline from the FCC, but the FCC denied
the stays.69
B. Procedural History
NextWave filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in New York
on June 8, 1998.70 NextWave then commenced suit in the United States
Bankruptcy Court, alleging that its $4.74 billion indebtedness on the C-
Block licenses was avoidable as a "fraudulent conveyance" under the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Section 544. 7 1 The court initially addressed
66. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 235 BR. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y
1998).
67. Id. at 267. The FCC issued the first "Restructuring Order" on October 16, 1997, which
provided distressed C-Block licensees with four distinct, mutually exclusive options regarding
financial relief for C-Block licensees. id. On receipt of numerous petitions for reconsideration,
oppositions, replies and ex parte filings, the FCC issued a "Reconsideration Order," in which the
FCC slightly modified the initial order to allow licensees somewhat more flexibility in making their
choices available under the Restructuring Order. Id None of the restructuring options allowed
licensees to keep any of their licenses for less than the full bid price. NextWave Pers.
Communications, Inc., 254 F.3d at 135. The FCC said the options balanced the goals of introducing
new spectrum services rapidly and promoting small business participation in PCS auctions against
the need to maintain auction integrity and treat unsuccessful bidders fairly. Id.
68. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 254 F.3d at 135.
69. Id. On May 8, 1998 NextWave petitioned the FCC for further reconsideration of the
Restructuring Orders, and on May 29, 1998 NextWave filed a petition for review of the
Restructuring Orders with the District of Columbia Circuit Court. NextWave Pers.
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 235 BR. 263, 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1998). NextWave asked both
the FCC and the Circuit Court for a stay of the June 8, 1998 deadline for its election of one of the
four alternatives provided in the Restructuring Orders. Id. Both the FCC and the Circuit Court
denied NextWave's requests for the stay of the June 8, 1998 deadline. Id.
70. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. at 267. NextWave suspended payments
to all creditors, including the FCC, pending confirmation of a reorganization plan. FCC v.
NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S 293, 297 (2003). It did not seek permission to
make installment payments under the "necessity of payment" doctrine, because the automatic stay
provision of the Bankruptcy Code generally prevented even government creditors' from enforcing
payment obligations or seizing assets of the estate, therefore it had no reason to believe it would be
required to make the October 1998 installment payment while in bankruptcy. NextWave Pers.
Communications, Inc., 254 F.3d at 136.
71. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. at 265. NextWave's theory was that by
the time the FCC actually conveyed the licenses, their value had declined from approximately $4.74
billion to less than $1 billion. Id. at 269.
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the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over the case.72 It determined that
it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case and held that NextWave's
winning bid exceeded the fair market value of its licenses at the time
they were conveyed. 7 The court ruled that the company could keep its
C-Block licenses for the reduced price of $1.02 billion.74
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision.75 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed on the grounds that the Bankruptcy
Court could not change the conditions attached to NextWave's
licenses.7 6 Following the Second Circuit's decision, NextWave prepared
a plan of reorganization in which it would pay a single lump-sum to
satisfy the entire remaining $4.3 Billion obligation for purchase of the C
block licenses, including interest and late fees.77  The FCC objected to
NextWave's reorganization plan, and announced that NextWave's
licenses were available for auction under the automatic cancellation
provisions.78
NextWave sought emergency relief in the Bankruptcy Court, which
72. Id. at 267-68. The court noted that Congress in 47 U.S.C. § 402 had vested in the Circuit
Courts of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, aside, annul or suspend orders of the FCC. Id.
The court recognized that this exclusive grant of jurisdiction related to adjudicating the
consequences of the conduct of the FCC acting within the scope of its Congressional mandate. Id.
at 268. The court further noted that Congress has granted the district and bankruptcy courts
exclusive jurisdiction to administer the Bankruptcy Code and Rules and to resolve claims, adversary
proceedings and contested matters arising under the Code. Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a) and (b),
Congress conferred jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases and proceedings to district courts. Id.
Congress further authorized district courts to refer jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases to the
bankruptcy judges in the district under 11 U.S.C. § 157. Id.
73. Next Wave Pers. Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. at 304.
74. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 235 B.R. 305, 307 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1998) (holding that the appropriate remedy, upon determination that licenses which debtor received
represented less than "reasonably equivalent value" for its $4.7 billion bid, was entry of order
avoiding debtor's entire obligation to the FCC, with reinstatement of obligation only to extent of
value actually given).
75. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 241 B.R. 311, 321 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1999).
76. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 200 F.3d 43, 59 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the FCC's system for allocation of
licenses and should have deferred to the FCC's interpretation of its regulations when determining
the point at which plaintiff debtor's obligations were incurred for 11 U.S.C. § 544 purposes). The
Second Circuit held that in granting licenses by auction, the FCC was acting as a creditor and a
regulator. Id. The Second Circuit also held that since, under FCC regulations NextWave's
obligation attached at the close of the auction, there had been no fraudulent conveyance by the FCC
acting in its capacity as creditor. Id.
77. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 298 (2003).
78. Id. The FCC objected to the plan, asserting NextWave's licenses had been automatically
canceled when the company missed its first payment deadline in October 1998. Id.
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declared the FCC's cancellation of the licenses "null and void" as a
violation of various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 79  The FCC
petitioned for a writ of mandamus 8 0 and the Second Circuit granted
mandamus and reversed the Bankruptcy Court's decision.81 NextWave
filed a petition with the FCC seeking reconsideration of the license
cancellation.82 The FCC addressed the challenge to the automatic
cancellation and rejected NextWave's arguments that the cancellation
83was arbitrary and capricious.
NextWave appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit from the FCC's decision on two basic
grounds.8 4 NextWave asserted the cancellation was arbitrary and
capricious and also that the license cancellation was unlawful under the
anti-discrimination provision, the automatic stay provision, and Section
1123, which allows a debtor to cure its defaults.85  The District of
79. In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 257 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding FCC "automatic" cancellation of PCS licenses in violation of the automatic stay specified
in II U.S.C.S. § 362(a), mandating that the assets of a debtor's estate remain intact for adjudication
by the bankruptcy court, and a "governmental" exception to the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C.S. §
362(b)(4) was found inapplicable because the FCC acted as creditor, not in any regulatory capacity).
80. In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2000). A writ of mandamus is defined as a "writ
issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or government officer to perform mandatory or
purely ministerial duties correctly." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (7th ed. 1999). The FCC
petitioned for mandamus on the ground that the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York violated the Court of Appeals' mandate expressed in FCC v. NextWave Pers
Communications, Inc. In re FCC, 217 F.3d at 129. The Court of Appeals' mandate held it was
beyond the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to mandate that a licensee be allowed to keep its license
despite its failure to meet the conditions to which the license is subject. FCC, 200 F.3d at 54.
81. In re FCC, 217 F.3d at 141. The Second Circuit held that "[e]xclusive jurisdiction to
review the FCC's regulatory action lies in the courts of appeals" under 47 U.S.C. § 402. Id. at 139.
The decision to re-auction the licenses was regulatory, and proclaiming it to be arbitrary was outside
the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. Id. at 141
82. NextWave Pets. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2001) aff'd,
537 U.S. 293 (2003). The FCC denied the petition, noting that the public notice of re-auction was
not an order or action of the FCC canceling NextWave's licenses, rather pursuant to FCC rules, the
licenses canceled automatically after NextWave filed to make its first installment payment. Id.
83. Id. The FCC ruled that NextWave's arguments were barred by estoppel and waiver, and
were summarily rejected by the Second Circuit and thus precluded under the doctrine of res
judicata. Id.
84. Id. at 139-140. NextWave appealed pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(b), asserting that the
cancellation was arbitrary and capricious, and contrary to law, violating the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, and the Bankruptcy Code. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc.,
537 U.S. at 299.
85. Next Wave Pers. Communications Inc., 254 F.3d at 139.
11 U.S.C. § 525 (a), the anti-discrimination provision, in relevant part provides:
a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license.., or
other similar grant to,... discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny
employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to
employment against, a person that is ... a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy
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Columbia Circuit agreed, holding the FCC's cancellation of NextWave's
licenses violated 11 U.S.C. Section 525.86 The FCC appealed the
District of Columbia Circuit's judgment and the United States Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari. 87 It did so to decide if Section 525 of
the Bankruptcy Code prohibited the FCC from revoking licenses held by
a debtor in bankruptcy upon the debtor's failure to make timely
payments owed to the FCC for purchase of the licenses.88
C. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
The Court, in an eight-to-one decision, affirmed the District of
Columbia Circuit's ruling and rejected all of the arguments in support of
the FCC's contention that Section 525 did not apply to its cancellation of
the licenses. 89 The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that
Section 525 prohibits the FCC from revoking licenses held by a
bankruptcy debtor upon the debtor's failure to make timely payments to
Act... solely because such bankrupt or debtor... has not paid a debt that is
dischargeable in the case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy
Act.
11 U.S.C. § 525(a).
11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the automatic stay provision, in relevant part provides:
a petition filed ... or application filed... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; (5) any
act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that
such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
86. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 254 F.3d at 156. The FCC never denied that if
NextWave had made its payments, the company would have retained its licenses. Id. at 149. The
court held that all federal agencies must obey all federal laws, not just the laws the agency
administers, therefore the FCC Violated the provision of the Bankruptcy Code that prohibits
governmental entities from revoking debtors' licenses solely for failure to pay debts dischargeable
in bankruptcy. Id. at 133.
87. FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 299 (2003).
88. Id. at 295. The FCC did not deny that the proximate cause for its cancellation of the
licenses was NextWave's failure to make the payments that were due. Id. at 301. The FCC argued
that § 525 does not apply because the FCC had a "valid regulatory motive" for the cancellation. Id.
The FCC also argued that NextWave's obligations to the FCC were not debts dischargeable in
bankruptcy. Id. at 302. The FCC argued that "regulatory conditions like the full and timely
payment condition are not properly classified as 'debts' under the Bankruptcy Code." Id. The FCC
further argued that the obligations were not "dischargeable" in bankruptcy because it was beyond
the jurisdictional authority of the bankruptcy courts to alter or modify regulatory obligations. Id. at
303. The FCC's final argument was an interpretation of § 525 that the FCC violated the automatic
stay provision would be in conflict with the auction provision of 47 U.S.C. § 3096). Id. at 304.
89. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. at 304-08.
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the FCC for purchase of the licenses. 90
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the FCC did not
revoke the respondents' licenses "solely because" of nonpayment under
Section 525(a).9' The fact that the FCC had a "valid regulatory motive"
was irrelevant.92  The Court was unwilling to provide a regulatory
exception to Section 525, as its express terms curtail the authority of
regulators.93 The Court considered, and rejected, the FCC's argument
that the money owed for the licenses was not a "debt" as recognized by
the Bankruptcy Code that was dischargeable in bankruptcy.94
90. Id. at 293. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Stevens joined the majority decision delivered by Justice Scalia. Id. at 294.
NextWave argued that its payment obligations were dischargeable debts, pointing to language of the
Code. John P. Hennigan, Jr., May the FCC Cancel a Spectrum License for Nonpayment of Fees,
Despite the Licensee's Bankruptcy? I PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 31 (2002) (previewing FCC v.
NextWave case). NextWave also emphasized that an obligation to pay is a "debt" regardless of
whether it is enforceable through conventional collection or incurred in a regulatory context. Id.
91. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. at 301. The FCC contended that
NextWave's payment obligations were not "debts," but rather regulatory conditions of the licenses.
Hennigan, supra note 90, at 31. If the obligations were regulatory conditions, they would be
beyond the power of any bankruptcy court to alter so long as the debtor retains the license. Id.
92. Id. at 301. Reading Section 525 to include an exception for the governmental unit's
motive in effecting the cancellation would deprive Section 525 of all force. Id. An exception for
cancellations that have a "valid regulatory purpose" would consume the rule. Id "Section 525
means nothing more or less than that the failure to pay a dischargeable debt must alone be the
proximate cause of the cancellation - the act or event that triggers the agency's decision to cancel,
whatever the agency's ultimate motive in pulling the trigger may be." Id. at 301-02.
93. Hennigan, supra note 90, at 301-02. The Court reasoned that Section 525 would have
little value if it did not apply to licensing authorities, stating:
Some may think (and the opponents of § 525 undoubtedly thought) that there ought to be
an exception for cancellations that have a valid regulatory purpose. Besides the fact that
such an exception would consume the rule, it flies in the face of the fact that, where
Congress has intended to provide regulatory exceptions to provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, it has done so clearly and expressly, rather than by a device so subtle as
denominating a motive a cause. There are, for example, regulatory exemptions from the
Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions. II U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). And even §
525(a) itself contains explicit exemptions for certain Agriculture Department programs,
see n.2, supra. These latter exceptions would be entirely superfluous if we were to read
§ 525 as the Commission proposes - which means, of course, that such a reading must
be rejected. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35-26 (1992).
Id. at 302.
94. Hennigan, supra note 90, at 302-03. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that
regulatory conditions, including full and timely payment condition are not properly classified as
debts. Id. at 302. The Court rejected the view that the "financial nature of a condition" on a license
"does not convert that condition into a debt." Id. Under the Bankruptcy Code, "debt" means
"liability on a claim," 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and "claim," includes any "right to payment," §
101(5)(A). Id. The Court previously held that "claim" has "the broadest available definition."
NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. at 302. The Court has also held that the plain
meaning of a "right to payment" means an enforceable obligation, regardless of the objectives. Id.
at 303. "[A] debt is a debt, even when the obligation to pay it is also a regulatory condition." Id.
20051
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The Court held that the bankruptcy courts did not need power to
alter or modify regulatory obligations to discharge the debt in
bankruptcy.95 Lastly, the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that
the Court's interpretation of Section 525 created conflict with the
Communications Act.96 The Court recognized the FCC's contention of a
conflict as a preference of the FCC for selling licenses on credit and
cancelling licenses rather than asserting security interests upon default.
97
Reasoning that there was "no inherent conflict between Section 525 and
the Communications Act," the Court could regard each statute as
effective. 98
2. The Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Stevens, agreed with
Parts I and II of the majority opinion, which included the background
facts and holding, 99 but had its own response to the contentions of the
dissent.100 Justice Stevens initially asserted Section 525(a) was "merely
intended to protect the debtor from discriminatory license terminations,"
as Justice Breyer argued in the dissent.101 Justice Stevens significantly
weighed the fact that the first words of the section describe three
exceptions for statutes.'0 2 Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Breyer's
view that the literal text of the statute does not always determine
congressional intent; however, he reasoned that in this case it produces
the correct answer. 
103
95. Id. at 303. A pre-confirmation debt is dischargeable unless it falls within an express
exception to discharge, Id.
96. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. at 304. The petitioner's contention that
this interpretation would obstruct the functioning of the auction provisions of the FCA, 47 U.S.C. §
309(j), was found to be invalid, since there is nothing in the provisions which demands 'that
cancellation be a sanction for failure to make payments. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 304. Part III, in which Justice Stevens did not join, was the majority's response to
the contentions of the dissent. Id. at 304-308.
100. Next Wave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. at 308-10 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101. Id.at308.
102. Id. The three exceptions in § 525(a) are the Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act,
1930, the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, and section 1 of the Act entitled, "An Act making
appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, and for
other purposes," approved July 12, 1943. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a). The Perishable Agriculture
Commodities Act, 1930 provided in relevant part, "whenever an applicant has paid the prescribed
fee the Secretary ... shall issue to such applicant a license ... the license of any licensee shall
terminate upon said licensee... being discharged as a bankrupt ... " 7 U.S.C. § 499d(a).
103. Next Wave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. at 310.
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3. The Dissent
Justice Breyer interpreted the meaning of the statute, considered the
statute's purpose, and relied on more than the literal meaning of the
words.' °4 Justice Breyer found the statute's purpose was to "forbid
discrimination against those who are, or were, in bankruptcy" and to
prohibit governmental action that would undercut the "fresh start" that
bankruptcy provides, but not to prevent government creditors from
collecting where these concerns are not present. 10 5  Justice Breyer
encouraged interpretation of the relevant phrase, "solely because" of
nonpayment of "a debt that is dischargeable," as requiring a certain
relationship between the dischargeability of the debt and the decision to
revoke the license. 0 6  Breyer urged that such an interpretation would
avoid preventing government debt collection efforts, and it would further
the statute's basic purpose.
10 7
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Next Wave Decision
The Supreme Court correctly decided that, regardless of the FCC's
alleged regulatory motive, cancellations of the licenses violated the
Bankruptcy Code. 10 8 If the FCC had the ability to avoid the constraints
104. Id, at 311 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer recognized that the law seeks to
regulate human activities in particular ways, and the law is also tied to life. Id. However, "a failure
to understand how a statutory rule is so tied can undermine the very human activity the law seeks to
benefit." Id. Justice Breyer noted that the FCC held a perfected security interest in the licenses, and
considered why it would be the intent of Congress to permit a private creditor to assert its security
interest in a bankruptcy case without violating Section 525, and not provide the same rights to the
Government. Id. at 312.
105. Id. at 315. Justice Breyer supported his proposed purpose of the statute through the
statute's title, its language, and its history. Id. at 313.
106. Id. at 316. Breyer concludes this interpretation as consistent with the statute's language,
accounting for the factual content and its intended significance. Id. Breyer also recognizes that this
interpretation is consistent with lower courts efforts to interpret the statute. Id. at 317.
107. Id. "[T]he majority's interpretation means that private creditors.. .can enforce security
interests in the goods they sell . . . but governments cannot enforce security interests in items that
they sell." Id at 319.
108. Id. at 301-02. As stated in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., reorganization allows the
business to "continue to provide jobs, to satisfy creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its
owners." 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983), citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1978, at 5787. The Supreme Court noted that "Congress presumed that the assets
of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if 'sold for scrap."'
Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203. Excluding assets such as the PCS licenses, "the reorganization
effort would have small chance of success" as the licenses are "essential to running the business."
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of the Code by merely characterizing its payment requirements as
"regulatory conditions," regulators would have free rein to eviscerate the
Bankruptcy Code. 10 9 The FCC is not exempt from the applicable
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and if the Court found otherwise,
other agencies would have followed with similar behavior."0  The
Court's decision makes it clear that regulations and actions of federal
agencies must comply with "any law, and not merely those laws that the
agency itself is charged with administering.""'
However, the Court's decision could have a negative impact in the
strategic use of bankruptcy. 1 2 Licensees can take more risk, effectively
buying one of two options. A licensee could either use the licenses to
obtain the financing to bring itself out of bankruptcy, or it could sell the
licenses at a higher price. 1 3  After the Court's decision, analysts
predicted that NextWave would exercise its call option and sell its
licenses "for a nice profit on its nearly $5 billion investment."' 14
The FCC argued that the licenses should not be included as
property in the estate of the debtor who entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
It believed that such licenses should be immediately revocable upon a
Id, citing 6 J. Moore & L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy 3.05, p. 431 (14th ed. 1978).
109. 537 U.S. at 302-3. If an agency was permitted to cancel a license for failure to meet a
"regulatory" payment condition, there would be virtually no situation where the license of a debtor
could not be cancelled. Id.
110. Id. The Code leaves much agency authority unaffected, but Congress has enacted a
number of restrictions on agency conduct that are essential to the protection of estate property and
the successful implementation of plans of reorganization. Id.
111. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. at 300; Jacqueline B. Stuart, Supreme
Court Rules Bankruptcy Code Prohibits FCC from Canceling Licenses, BANKRUPTCY BULLETIN,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Vol. 10 No. 2, February 2003. Regulatory agencies are subject to
the Bankruptcy Code provisions prohibiting debt collection no less than non-governmental
creditors, and they cannot avoid such Code provisions by alleging reliance on their regulatory
functions. Id. The decision clarifies the scope of Section 525 and also provides certainty to debtors
whose affairs interact with the licensing functions of regulatory agencies. Id.
112. See generally The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases, 117 HARv. L. REV. 390,
395-98 (November 2003) (finding that the Court's decision allows companies to utilize bankruptcy
strategically). If a licensee did not file Chapter 11, the licenses would automatically cancel upon
default. Id. at 395.
113. Id. If the company was only speculating when it originally bid on the licenses, it can
capture any appreciation in value without developing the license. Id. Analysts following
NextWave stated that the company "really wasn't in a position to build out the networks." Id. at
396 (quoting Gautam Naik & Bryan Gruley, NextWave's Tactics at Wireless Auction Are Under
Fire, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1996, at B4).
114. ld. at 396-97 (quoting Dan Meyer, What's Next for NextWave?, RCR WIRELESS NEWS,
Feb. 3, 2003, at 1). Indeed, in August 2003, NextWave announced that it sold about twenty percent
of its licenses to Cingular Wireless for $1.4 billion. Christopher Stem, Cingular Agrees to Buy
NextWave Wireless Licenses, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2003, at El.
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licensee's failure to meet the conditions for holding the license.1 15
1. FCC's Action Frustrated Congressional Intent
In anticipating the Supreme Court's decision, the FCC changed its
diversity auction financing policies, discontinuing the use of installment
payments in January 1998.116 The purpose behind Section 525 of the
Bankruptcy Code is to prevent governmental units from frustrating
congressional intent to provide debtors with a fresh start.117 Publicly, the
FCC articulated that it was bound by the same bankruptcy rules as all
other creditors since it chose to create a standard debt obligation as a
part of the installment payment scheme. Creditors of NextWave relied
on these representations, and the FCC frustrated Congress's intent when
it changed its position.'18
When Congress grants special bankruptcy status to a particular
government agency or program it does so explicitly. The FCC's
position went against everything Congress hoped to promote. 119
115. Deborah L. Schrier-Rape & Jason S. Brookner, The FCC as Creditor: Attempts to
Legislate Out of the Bankruptcy Court, AM. BANKR. INST., http://abiworld.org/legis/
reform/dsrspeech.htmIl (June 16, 1999). The FCC argued that if the licenses were subject to being
restructured in the same manner as other obligations, the licenses would be unnecessarily tied up in
bankruptcy and their deployment delayed. Id.
116. Competitive Bidding Proceeding, 63 Fed. Reg. 2315, 2318-19 (FCC Jan. 15, 1998);
Harvard Law Review, supra note 112, at 398. The FCC's motive for ending installment payments
was in response to the anticipated result in NextWave. Id. If the FCC did not change its policy, it
would enable a company to buy licenses on installment, pay a down payment, and lock the licenses
in bankruptcy. Id at 397.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 525.
118. Brief of Amici Curiae Creditors of NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. at 2, FCC v.
NextWave, 537 U.S. 293 (2003) (Nos. 01-653, 01-657). The FCC frustrated Congress's intent
because the very risk Congress wanted investors to take on small businesses within the
telecommunications industry would be severely punished by the FCC stepping in front of all the
other creditors and claiming the licenses automatically canceled. Id. at 3. The licenses were the
bulk of the value of NextWave. Id. The FCC changed its position when the value of the licenses
was increasing. Id. at 2. The FCC's position would have caused small business financing for the
licenses to disappear, for no rational creditor would invest in a company like NextWave if the FCC
were authorized in the event of bankruptcy to revoke the essential licenses on which the company's
business plan depends. Id. at 4-5.
119. Id. at 5. Congress has created special regulatory exceptions to the automatic stay
provision with explicit requirements, which the FCC did not meet. Id Congress has squarely
rejected legislative proposals to confer special bankruptcy status on the FCC. Id. In a letter dated
May 12, 2000, members of the House Judiciary Committee explained that:
[e]very member of the [Commercial and Administrative Law] Subcommittee present at
the hearing expressed his concern or disagreement with the FCC's position that it is
exempt from the automatic stay provision - a position contrary to congressional intent
when it enacted section 362 (b) in 1997 ... [The FCC's proposals] conflict with one of
the Bankruptcy Code's fundamental tenets that all similarly situated creditors be treated
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Congress enacted Section 3090) of the Communications Act with the
understanding that federal agencies are governed by the Bankruptcy
Code. 120
Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code reflects Congress's judgment
that a debtor's licenses are often indispensable to its ability to
reorganize.121  The FCC's refusal to comply with Section 525 threatened
to defeat the claims of all other creditors, and derailed the reorganization
that would have paid the FCC and NextWave's other creditors in full. 
122
B. FCC Alternatives in Light ofNextWave
The decision in NextWave requires the FCC to conduct itself as any
other creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding, while still distributing
licenses pursuant to Congress's mandate. 123  The FCC can proceed by
changing its method of distributing licenses, urging Congress to change
its position regarding small businesses, or allocating licenses in a
different manner, as to allow small businesses to target markets that will
not be in direct competition with the industry giants.1
24
equally absent significant public policy reasons warranting some form of preferred
treatment (e.g., police and regulatory enforcement officials, spousal and child support
claimants, victims of fraud). These proposals, however, would endow the FCC with
more protection than virtually any other creditor, including the Internal Revenue Service,
has under the current bankruptcy law ... If enacted, this proposed legislation could
potentially destroy a debtor's prospect for economic rehabilitation and deprive creditors
of a major source of repayment.
See 145 Cong. Rec. S 14,104 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1999) (Johnson Amendment No. 2523 to Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1999, S. 625).
120. Brief of Amici Curiae Creditors of NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. at 9, FCC v.
NextWave, 537 U.S. 293 (2003) (Nos. 01-653, 01-657). There is no conflict between Section 309(j)
of the Communications Act and Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. If there was a conflict,
it would be resolved by a principle governing the development of federal statutory law, which finds
a very strong presumption that a federal agency is not exempt from pre-existing background federal
statutes, except where the law expressly provides. Id.
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 525(a); Brief of Amici Curiae Creditors of NextWave Pers.
Communications, Inc. at 16, FCC v. NextWave, 537 U.S. 293 (2003) (Nos. 01-653, 01-657).
Preserving the debtor's ability to retain its licenses advances the Code's goals of rehabilitating
debtors, maximizing the value of the estate for creditors, and ensuring that all creditors are treated
fairly. See infra notes 27-40, and accompanying text.
122. Brief of Amici Curiae Creditors of NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. at 16-18, FCC
v. NextWave, 537 U.S. 293 (2003) (Nos. 01-653, 01-657).
123. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. at 304. In drafting rules for future
license auctions, the FCC is likely to be less generous in proving credit terms to financially
constrained buyers. H. Jason Gold & Valerie P. Morrison, United States Supreme Court Holds FCC
in Violation of the Bankruptcy Code, available at http://www.wrf.conattomey/publications.
asp?id=G432064236 (January 27, 2003). Other agencies would be wise to review their license
cancellation regulations for compliance with the Court's new mandate. Id.
124. See infra, notes 125-199 and accompanying text.
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1. Auctions and the Competitive Bidding Process
The FCC believes that competitive bidding is the appropriate way
to distribute PCS licenses, as it maximizes spectrum investment and
activity. 25 Auctions were intended to correct problems associated with
lotteries and comparative hearings, the previous methods implemented
by the FCC to assign licenses.126  However, due to the competing
interests that the FCC is trying to meet, the current system of license
distribution is not necessarily the most efficient option.' 27 The primary
advantage to using an auction system to distribute licenses is its
tendency to assign the spectrum to those best able to use it.' 28 Auctions
do not remedy the inherent deficiencies in administrative allocation of
the spectrum. 129  Furthermore, the outcome in recent auctions with
125. William Kummer, Spectrum Bids, Bets, and Budgets: Seeking an Optimal Allocation and
Assignment Process for Domestic Commercial Electromagnetic Spectrum Products, Services, and
Technology, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 511, 527-28 (1996) (analyzing the allocation and assignment of
electromagnetic spectrum licenses for commercial use through competitive bidding). Public
revenue is maximized as the fair market value of the electromagnetic spectrum less auction
administrative expenses goes to the U.S. Treasury, and taxes rise due to increased economic
activity. Id. at 527. Speed of development increases because high licensing costs induce successful
bidders to launch services as soon as possible to recover large initial investment. Id. Universal
service increases as low prices of rural licenses reduce development costs and attract investors
unable or unwilling to make capital requirements necessary to develop major metropolitan licenses.
Id. High levels of spectrum efficiency and use are achieved as high spectrum costs foster large
investments in technology to expand capacity. Id. at 527-28.
126. Hazlett, supra note 16, at 642. It was argued that auctions would reduce rent-seeking,
speed licenses to the marketplace, capture license rents for the Federal Treasury rather than
"squander" them on lucky or politically connected applicants, and enhance performance because the
auction winners would be most likely to implement services most efficiently. Id.
127. See Rob Frieden, Balancing Equity and Efficiency Issues in the Management of Shared
Global Radiocommunication Resources, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 289, 311-14 (2003) (examining
the merits of maintaining, revamping, or abandoning the current administrative processes for
managing international spectrum and satellite orbital slots). Globally, governments have authorized
competitive bidding, for select portions of radio spectrum. Id. at 312. Congress desires the FCC to
promote small businesses, but at the same time the licenses need to be distributed in an efficient
manner. Hazlett, supra note 16, at 640. The A and B Block auctions took 98 days to complete the
112 rounds of bidding. Id at 647. Furthermore, the winning bidders were mostly previous filers
with the FCC, so the review of the winning bidders' final applications was expedited. Id. However,
the C Block auction was designated for small businesses, and the FCC had special ownership rules
and criteria required for applicants. Id. at 648. This increased the administrative analysis and
competitor scrutiny. Id. GWI, the third highest bidder in the C-Block auction was not granted its
licenses until nine months after the auction was closed. Id.
128. Peter Cramton, Spectrum Auctions, in HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ECONOMICS 605-640, 608 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002). Companies that most highly value the
spectrum are likely to bid higher to win the licenses. Id. Well-designed auctions are more likely to
be highly efficient, with competition for the licenses not being wasteful, as it leads to auction
revenues. Id.
129. Frieden, supra note 127, at 317. Opponents to auctioning of spectrum argue that the
notions of public interest in the distribution of the spectrum is a vague, ill-defined concept. Id. The
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companies like NextWave demonstrates that overbidding can lead to
bankruptcies and confusion over who retains title to the spectrum.' 
30
The competitive bidding or auction-style process is not an efficient
means to distribute PCS licenses.' 31  Each license covers a specified
area, and in order to create a contiguous service area, the companies
have to hedge their bids and hope that they get enough licenses to be
able to provide full coverage in one area.' 32 The FCC views competitive
bidding as a market-based approach to fulfilling the mandate of FCA
Section 309 that telecommunications licenses be awarded to serve the
"public interest, convenience, and necessity."' 33
However, the FCC recognized that a licensee's failure to make full
and timely payment indicated that the agency had not identified the best
applicant. 134 The financial difficulties leading to default may disable the
licensee from exploiting the spectrum in the public interest. 135 The FCC
feared that tolerance for default could invite speculative bidding and
undermine the integrity of the auction process. 136  In light of the
Supreme Court's decision, the FCC needs to rethink its distribution of
licenses. 131
2. Alternatives to Auctions
Other possible means of distributing licenses include an
administrative process or lotteries, both of which have been used and
rejected in the United States. 38 An administrative process requires those
FCC has established "many protectionist, anti-competitive, anti-innovative, inflexible, output-
limiting regulatory regimes" under the public interest scheme. Id. (quoting Lawrence J. White,
"Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin, 9 MEDIA L.
& POL'Y 19 (2000)).
130. Id. at 317-318.
131. Cramton, supra note 128.
132. Id.
133. Hennigan, supra note 90, at 31.
134. Id. The FCC suspended the use of installment payments as a means of financing small
business participation in the auction program in January 1998. Competitive Bidding Proceeding, 63
Fed. Reg. at 2326-2327. The FCC changed the down payment requirement to 20 percent of the high
bid amount as well. Id. at 2326. The FCC believed that a substantial down payment was required
to ensure that licensees have the financial capability necessary to deploy and operate their systems,
and to protect against default. Id.
135. Hennigan, supra note 90, at 31. This is the reason why the promotion of small business in
the telecommunication industry is no longer a wise decision.
136. Id.
137. H. Jason Gold & Valerie P. Morrison, United States Supreme Court Holds FCC in
Violation of the Bankruptcy Code, available at http://www.wrf.com/attomey/
publications.asp?id=G432064236 (January 27, 2003).
138. Cramton, supra note 128, at 607.
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interested in the spectrum to inform the licensing agency how they
intend to use it, and the agency awards spectrum to those with the most
attractive proposals.139  After the FCC rejected this type of allocation,
the agency switched to lotteries, where the FCC would randomly select
license winners from among those that apply.1 40  The inefficiencies in
both processes led the FCC to abandon them in favor of auctions.
141
3. Should Congress Continue to Promote Designated Entities?
The FCC hoped to meet its mandate of assigning licenses to a wide
variety of applicants by structuring auctions under the assumption that
the primary obstacle for small business and minority-or-women-owned
firms was their lack of access to private capital markets.142  The FCC
established a program of benefits for these so called designated bidders,
with the potential bidder required to meet certain criteria based on size
and ownership status to be eligible for the benefits package. 143  This
program caused delays in deployment of the licenses, used government
funds to subsidized the entitles, and hurt consumers. 44
a. Promoting Small Businesses Does Not Benefit Consumers
Promoting small and diverse owners is a desirable goal in some
sectors that require licenses, such as those which contain editorial
content; however, the same arguments do not translate to mobile
wireless communications. 45  Small businesses in the PCS industry did
not benefit from the FCC's separate designated C and F Block
139. Id. Allocating the spectrum in this manner is very slow and wasteful, taking the FCC an
average of two years to award thirty cellular licenses. Id. Competitors spent large amounts of
money to influence the regulators decisions, and when final decisions were made, it was difficult to
see why one proposal won out over another. Id.
140. Id. Here, because the licenses are so valuable, there is a strong incentive for a large
number of applicants. Id. The FCC received over four hundred thousand applications for its
cellular lotteries, wasting resources in creating and processing the applications. Id. at 607-08. The
winners were not always those best suited to provide the services, and it took years for the licenses
to be transferred through private markets to those capable of building out a service. Id. at 608.
141. Id. at 607-08.
142. Hazlett, supra note 16, at 641. The benefits available to these designated entities included
preferential financing programs and bidding credits. Id.
143. Id.
144. See generally, Hazlett, supra note 16, at 650-56.
145. Cramton, supra note 128, at 634. Special treatment to designated entitles are premised on
the idea that small is good; however, within the wireless communications industry there are
significant economies of scale. Id. Larger competitors are able to better bargain with equipment
suppliers and have the ability to market in a more efficient manner. Id.
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auctions. 146  The FCC created a system which ultimately set up these
small businesses for failure.147 It decided that an auction system was the
most effective means to implement Section 3090) of the FCA. 148  The
FCC divided broadband PCS spectrum into six auction blocks, and
designated the third and the sixth blocks for small businesses.
149
However, it was inappropriate for the FCC to conduct the "designated
entity" auction and create a situation whereby the designated entities
were encouraged to bid money they did not have.' 50
A study commissioned by Verizon Wireless found that the FCC's
actions regarding NextWave's licenses delayed implementation of new
wireless services and impeded wireless investment that would have
increased the United States' gross domestic product by between $19
billion and $52 billion."'
The FCC's actions locked the licenses in court proceedings, and
prevented any company from using them until the dispute was
resolved. 152  If NextWave could have used the licenses, it might have
been able to implement its business plan, increasing competition in the
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. In re Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act, 9 FCC Rcd 2348, P71
(1994). "Since a bidder's ability to introduce valuable new services and to deploy them quickly,
intensively, and efficiently increase the value of a license to a bidder, an auction design that awards
licenses to those bidders with the highest willingness to pay tends to promote the development and
rapid deployment of new services ... and the efficient and intensive use of the spectrum." Id.
However, this is inherently flawed reasoning, as small businesses may have an innovative concept,
but if they have to obtain the licenses through an auction, which could irrationally raise the price of
the license, the small businesses are then locked into a higher payment to the FCC. This would
cause the small businesses to have to use capital obtained to build out the market to satisfy
installment payments on over priced licenses.
149. Hennigan, supra note 90, at 31. Because the licenses covered largely the same
geographical areas and spectrum allocated, this was not an appropriate method to distribute licenses.
The FCC's scheme does not make sense on how it would effectively implement Congressional
intent. Valuation of the available spectrum in each auction is a difficult task. Leslie Taylor,
Telecommunications Reports, available at http://www.lta.com/res_ articles/ontherecord.htm. In the
six different broadband PCS auctions, there was a huge variation in the amounts per megahertz paid
for the licenses. Id. Bidders need to consider the value of combining licenses in different markets,
if they plan on bidding in different markets. Id.
150. Taylor, supra note 149. This system created a situation where the designated entities
were more likely inexperienced in the telecommunications industry and had no way to accurately
gauge if they would be able to get the money in the future. Id.
151. Jeremy Feiler, Study: Industry Hurt by Airwaves Auction Inaction, available at
http://www.bizjoumals.com/philadelphia/stories/2002/09/02/newscolumn I.html. The FCC refused
to cancel the results of the auction in which it re-auctioned NextWave's seized licenses. Id. This
has caused financial troubles for bidders in the second auction, as the have not received any benefit
from the licenses which were locked in the court proceedings, but still had to recognize the debt
incurred as a 'contingent liability.' This treatment hurt the bidders' credit rating. Id.
152. Agencies Can't Renege on Business Contracts, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 29, 2003, at 10A.
[20:85
28
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 20 [2005], Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol20/iss1/4
FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUMICATIONS, INC.
industry and ultimately benefiting customers. 153 Now, with the large
national wireless providers firmly entrenched in the industry, NextWave
will be forced to sell some of its airwave space to other companies. 
154
b. Large Companies Have the Means and Ability to Improve
the Industry
In the telecommunications industry, the size of the company does
matter. 155 Consumers in the marketplace have shifted demand toward
nationwide wireless services. 156 Companies within the industry need to
be large enough and produce sufficient cash flow to absorb the costs of
expanding networks and services that quickly become obsolete. 157 One
of the biggest barriers to entry into the industry is its capital-intensive
nature. 158 All of these factors lead to a situation where it is unrealistic
for Congress to think that small businesses will be able to enter the
industry. 1
59
The effect of the congressional mandate to encourage small
businesses to enter the industry has a detrimental effect far beyond the
FCC not being able to automatically cancel licenses upon default.
160
Many established telecommunication equipment suppliers provided
equipment to these smaller companies on credit in the hopes of
benefiting as the new companies grew. 16' However, the unprecedented
economic expansion in the late 1990s abruptly reversed, causing
equipment providers who went out on a limb for these small businesses
to now face financial difficulty.
162
The ripple effect extends seemingly without limit: the small
business such as NextWave petitions for bankruptcy protection, largely
to avoid the installment payment due to the FCC; the larger equipment
supplier, or other creditor that has extended equipment or capital is now
forced to the end of the line, waiting for any meager percentage of
153. Id.
154. See supra note 125, and accompanying text.
155. See Cramton, supra note 128, at 634.
156. Id. Providing nationwide services requires billion dollar deals, and what consumers
ultimately need is a variety of strong national competitors. Id. Small regional players cannot




160. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Creditors of NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc.
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payment for the debts owed to it. 16 3  These companies are now facing
bankruptcy, or other serious financial troubles.
164
C. Proposed Solutions to the Problems Facing the FCC
1. Congress Needs to Abandon Favors to Designated Entities
The auction system is the most efficient allocation of the spectrum.
However, Congress needs to abandon its policy of setting aside auctions
for designated entities.165  To prevent over-consolidation of spectrum,
the FCC can use spectrum caps to guarantee new entry where it is
desirable.166 The events of the C Block auction demonstrate that using
special incentives to encourage participation of designated entities can
163. Id.
164. Id. The Creditors Committee was the official representative of the thousands of
businesses and investors who extended hundreds of millions of dollars in services, goods, and
financing to NextWave to enable NextWave to acquire its licenses, build out its network, and fund
its operations. Id. at 1. The group included corporate investors such as Sony, QUALCOMM, and
Hughes Network Systems; hundreds of small businesses which provided supplies and services
toward the build-out of the network; and large investment funds which manage money for banks,
pension funds, and insurance companies. Id. The Creditors Committee wanted to ensure that the
FCC was subject to the same rules the Bankruptcy Code applies to all other creditors. Id. This was
especially critical as NextWave's reorganization plan proposed to pay in full not only the FCC's
claim, but also each of the claims of the Creditor Committee's constituents. Id. at 2. Various
lenders financed NextWave after commencement of the Chapter 11 proceedings, to allow
NextWave to continue operations; in conjunction with this financing, they took liens on the
proceeds of NextWave's licenses to secure repayment of its loans. Id. The lenders obtained the
bankruptcy court's prior approval of these liens upon notice to the FCC. Id. The FCC never
objected to the liens on the ground that the licenses had canceled (or could be canceled) for non-
payment. Id. The lenders relied on the FCC's repeated acknowledgement that NextWave's licenses
would not cancel while NextWave attempted to reorganize. Id.
165. These entities do not have the means to successfully implement a nationwide full service
system, which consumers now demand. Cramton, supra note 128, at 634. Furthermore, there are
more effective means of encouraging bids by small businesses. Rural Carriers Urge End of Set-
Asides for Designated Entities, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, August 2, 2004. Bidding credits for
these designated entities, used in open license auctions, would give these small businesses more
opportunity. Id.
166. Crarmton, supra note 128, at 633. A spectrum cap is a direct method of limiting the
concentration of spectrum for a particular type of service in a particular area. Id. Spectrum caps
can promote competition by limiting a firm to a specific quantity of spectrum it can hold in any
market. Id. The FCC utilizes this method, and so far it has played a critical role in ensuring that
there are many competitors for mobile wireless service in each market. Id. Consumers benefit from
this increased competition: Id. However, spectrum caps are not able to take into account the
specifics of each situation. Id. The ultimate policy on spectrum caps would be a middle ground,
with binding caps imposed on initial auctions, but once it is believed that vigorous competition has
been established the caps should give way. Id. Mergers in the industry should be reviewed on a
case by case basis. Id.
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be very troublesome.' 67
If Congress does not abandon its mandate to promote small
businesses within the telecommunication industry, then the FCC should
restructure its auction system.' 68 Under the auction system used in the
PCS A through F Block auctions, small and large companies were able
to bid on licenses covering much of the same geographic locations.
169
This was inefficient and troublesome in many respects. First, small
businesses do not have a great likelihood of survival in the
telecommunications industry. 70  Second, this also hurts the larger,
established businesses, because they are blocked from obtaining more
licenses to provide service for their customers.171
2. The FCC Should Support Consolidation Within the Industry
The current industry is dominated by "The Big Six"; however,
industry consolidation is likely to change the dynamics of the
industry. 172  Industry observers argue consolidation will benefit
consumers, with proponents predicting better rates and service packages
in the long term, while opponents recognize that in the interim the
industry will be in flux. 73  Cingular Wireless announced in February
2004 that it would acquire AT & T Wireless and become the largest
wireless carrier in the United States.
174
167. Id. at 634. The FCC's overly attractive installment payments encouraged speculative
bidding, leading all major bidders to default and declare bankruptcy. Id. Favors to designated
entities greatly complicate the auction process. Id. at 635. The rules and administration of
determining designated status often becomes a central issue in establishing the auction procedures.
Id. The worst outcome is having the licenses tied up in litigation; until the litigation is resolved, the
building of communication services cannot begin, Id.
168. Id. at 633-35.
169. See supra notes 19-26, 64-65 and accompanying text.
170. See generally Patterson, supra note 6. NextWave is just one of the many small businesses
that had to result to bankruptcy to help find a resolution to its problems.
171. Id.
172. Denise Pappalardo & Jim Duffy, Consolidation Might Be New Wireless Plan, available at
http://www.nwfusion. com/news/2004/0119attcin.btml (January 19, 2004). The "Big Six" are
Verizon Wireless, Cingular Wireless, AT & T Wireless, Sprint PCS, Nextel, and T-Mobile. Id.
173. Id. Once the deals are complete, network, customer service, and billing integration will
follow. Id.
174. Cingular Wireless, Cingular to Acquire AT & T Wireless, Create Nation's Premier
Carrier, available at http:// www.cingular.com/about/latestnews/04_02 17 (February 17, 2004).
The combined company would have 46 million customers, and one of the most advanced digital
networks in the United States, with spectrum in 49 states and coverage in 97 of the top 100 markets.
Id. Stan Sigman, president and CEO of Cingular Wireless states that the acquisition will benefit
consumers, through the combined strengths of the companies enabling it to create customer benefits
and growth prospects for "better coverage, improved reliability, enhanced call quality, and a wide
array of new and innovative services for consumers." Id.
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3. The FCC Should Encourage Designated Entities to Specialize in
the Industry
If small businesses are to survive in the telecommunications
industry, they need to specialize within the industry in order to set
themselves apart from the large industry leaders.
175
One option for the smaller firms is to focus on smaller geographic
or rural areas. The limited amount of PCS services offered in rural areas
continues to be an ongoing problem faced by the FCC. 176  The FCC
recognizes that on the national scale, the deployment of wireless mobile
service has been successful-resulting in increased competition and
services overall-but is still trying to resolve the issue of providing
telecommunications services in sparsely populated, expansive rural
areas. 177  The FCC could focus small businesses' licenses in rural and
localized areas to solve both problems.
78
Geographic size can be a disadvantage, particularly if a company's
customers are too spread out. 179 Dominating a local market will increase
profitability through economies of scale. 180 Nextel's performance is
175. Darren Sextro, Consolidation, Speculation, Specialization, available at
http://www.wirelessreview.com/ar/wireless-consolidation-speculation-specialization/ (March 1,
1999).
176. See Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting
Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, 68 Fed. Reg.
64,050 (proposed November 12, 2003). The FCC continues to examine ways to promote the rapid
and efficient deployment of quality spectrum-based services in rural areas. Id. The FCC's primary
mission is the promotion of "communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio
communications service." Id.
177. Id. The FCC recognizes that there is a need to service rural areas, not only to enable
Americans who travel, -reside or conduct business throughout the country to communicate
effectively, but also for the benefit of the general public interest. Id
178. See generally Darren Sextro, Consolidation, Speculation, Specialization, available at
http://www.wirelessreview. com/ar/wirelessconsolidation speculation specialization! (March 1,
1999); Bruce Meyerson, Keeping Up With the Big Wireless Boys, available at
http://www.madison.conarchives/read.php?ref - tct:2004:02:24:335685:BUSINESS (February 24,
2004).
179. Bruce Meyerson, Keeping Up With the Big Wireless Boys, available at
http://www.madison.conLarchives/read. php?ref-tct:2004:02:24:335685:BUSINESS (February 24,
2004). There are advantages to the large companies, such as being able to spread the monumental
operating costs from the wireless business across a far larger customer base. Id.
180. Id. For example, Nextel only has 12.9 million subscribers, whose monthly bills are
among the highest in the wireless industry, averaging $69 per month in 2003. Id. The company's
chum rate, the measure of how many customers close their accounts, averaged 1.6 percent per
month in 2003. Id. Verizon Wireless has 37.5 million customers, with an average monthly bill of
$49 per month, and a chum rate of 1.8 percent. Id. Cingular's customers' average monthly bill was
$51, with a churn rate of 2.7 percent. Id. AT & T Wireless's customers' monthly bill averaged $60,
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largely due to focusing on high-usage business customers, who are
willing to pay more for special features, like the company's pioneered
walkie-talkie service.' 8
Airadigm Communications, Inc., is an example of a small business
that operates PCS systems in Wisconsin and Iowa in mostly rural areas
and many on tribal lands. 182  Airadigm temporarily ceased making its
debt payments to the FCC and its other creditors while it was in
bankruptcy. 183 Airadigm has borne great cost to provide service to less
populated rural areas that have been underserved.1
84
The large companies are currently focusing on developing their
networks and providing expanded services in the larger cities where the
demand is already established. 185  Small businesses should choose to
target local areas, and develop some sort of meaningful PCS network in
these areas. 86  Smaller businesses could focus their resources and
and a 2.6 percent chum. Id.
181. Id. Sprint PCS is taking a similar approach to Nextel, by differentiating itself with
handsets and advanced non-voice services, like picture messaging and wireless Web access. Id.
182. Brief of Amici Curiae Airadigm Communications, Inc., at 1, FCC v. NextWave, 537 U.S.
293 (Nos. 01-653, 01-657). Airadigm provides service to more than 30,000 subscribers, and even
after filing bankruptcy has continued to serve the public and fulfill the statutory goal of deploying
"new technologies, products, and services for the benefit of the public, including those residing in
rural areas." Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)).
183. Id. Airadigm concentrated on providing service where it was needed most, underserved
markets. Id. at 2. The first cell sites activated were on the Oneida reservation, where no service had
previously been provided. Id
184. Id. Airadigm concentrated initial efforts on a landline replacement business model, which
brought competition to wireless and traditional landline operators. Id. The company's ambitious
business plan required heavy investment in network equipment and when subscriber revenue fell
short of predictions, Airadigm ran into financial difficulties. Id. at 2-3. The company filed a
Chapter II petition, and soon secured additional debtor-in-possession financing and working capital
loans. Id. at 3. The company refocused its business model, and turnaround seemed complete in
October 2000, when Airadigm's plan of reorganization was confirmed. Id. January 2000 marked
the FCC's announcement that NextWave's licenses had automatically cancelled and would be
reauctioned. Id. This was very bad for Airadigm, as the FCC informed the company that they
would take the same position on its licenses. Id. The FCC actively participated in Airadigm's
bankruptcy, but had never claimed that the quarterly interest payments should be among various
current obligations. Id.
185. U.S. Department of Transportation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, Wireless
Telecommunications Carrier Industry Overview, (March 2001), at http://www.its.
dot.gov/51 I/PDF/Wireless Telecom.pdf. Six wireless carriers offer their services nationwide,
available to over 190 million people. Id.
186. See generally Darren Sextro, Consolidation, Speculation, Specialization, available at
http://www.wirelessreview.com/ar/wireless-consolidation-speculation specialization/ (March 1,
1999); Bruce Meyerson, Keeping Up With the Big Wireless Boys, available at
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provide needed services in rural areas.' 87 They could then negotiate with
the larger companies some sort of borrowed airtime or coverage, for the
consumers who subscribe to the large companies services, but are found
in the rural areas. 88 This would provide additional revenue for the
smaller companies to continue to develop and expand their networks.
1 89
Furthermore, the smaller companies would also have the option of
selling their pre-built networks to the larger companies once they were
fully established.' 90
Another option for the small businesses and designated entities is to
specialize in providing targeted services. 19' Small businesses can
succeed by adopting a different sales practice, focusing on the specific
needs of a vertical market. 1
92
4. The FCC Should Redesign the Allocation of PCS Licenses
The greatest room for improvement in the auction process lies not
within the auction design, but in the allocation process. 93 Determining
proper allocation of the spectrum involves complex political,
engineering, and economic factors.' 94 Economic gains would come from
better allocations of spectrum. 195  The FCC would benefit from
redefining the allocation of the spectrum, and could encourage small
businesses and designated entities through the allocation of the
187. U.S. Department of Transportation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, Wireless
Telecommunications Carrier Industry Overview, (March 2001), at http://www.its.
dot.gov/511/PDF/WirelessTelecom.pdf. The carriers which provide service in rural areas can
become key roaming partners to many of the larger national and regional carriers. Id.
188. Cramton, supra note 128, at 605-40.
189. Id.
190. Id. NextWave is now in the process of creating its reorganization plan, which must be
filed by mid-October with the Bankruptcy Court. Chris Nolter, All Eyes on NextWave's Exit, DAILY
DEAL, September 6, 2004. NextWave has sold some of its spectrum to other wireless companies,
such as Verizon Wireless and MetroPCS, Inc. Id. The money received from these sales will enable
NextWave to propose a plan that not only pays creditors in full, but also provide value to equity
holders. Id.
191. Darren Sextro, Consolidation, Speculation, Specialization, available at
http://www.wirelessreview.com/ar/ wireless-consolidation-speculation-specialization (March 1,
1999).
192. Id. Vertical markets, such as utilities, transportation, and agriculture have not been sought
after for public wireless networks. Id,
193. Cramton, supra note 128, at 637. The allocation of the spectrum defines the'license,
which is comprised of the frequency band, the geographic area, the time period, and the restrictions
on use. Id. at 631. The focus has been on the assigning of the licenses; however, the allocation step
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spectrum. 196
The FCC could address the issues facing people in rural areas,
which are not being serviced by the larger companies in the industry if it
redefined the allocation process of the licenses.197 The feasibility of a
small start-up company surviving in the large cities is slim to none.198
Forcing the smaller businesses to focus on the rural, non-serviced areas
enables them to create a niche in the marketplace. 99
V. CONCLUSION
Congress should reconsider its policy objective of requiring the
FCC to promote small businesses and other designated entities when it
distributes PCS licenses. The policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code
and its "fresh start" offered to restructuring companies overshadow the
FCC's authority within bankruptcy proceedings. This is necessary to
maintain equilibrium among creditors. Consumers are interested in
nationwide wireless service, which can realistically only be offered by
the large national carriers which are firmly established in the industry.
Auctioning the PCS licenses seems to be the most appropriate way
to distribute the licenses.2 °° Most of the problems stemming from the
auctioning system resulted from Congress's mandate to promote small
businesses and other designated entities. 201  The auction system allows
bidders who most highly value the licenses to obtain them, which
maximizes revenues for the government. By eliminating separate
auctions for small businesses, the most capable companies would obtain
the licenses, which would result in the most efficient use of limited
resources.
202
Promoting small businesses and other designated entities does not
196. Id.
197. See generally Darren Sextro, Consolidation, Speculation, Specialization, available at
http://www.wirelessreview. com/ar/wirelessconsolidationspeculation specialization/ (March 1,
1999); Bruce Meyerson, Keeping Up With the Big Wireless Boys, available at
http://www.madison.com/archives/read. php?refrtct:2004:02:24:335685:BUSINESS (February 24,
2004).
198. Id.
199. A market niche is a focused, tangible portion of a market. Susan Ward, Niche Market,
available at http://sbinfocanada.about.com/library/glossary/bldef-nichemark.htm. By definition, a
business that focuses on a niche market is addressing a need for a product or service that is not
being addressed by mainstream providers. Id. The advantage of a niche market is being alone
there; other small businesses may not be aware of the particular market, and large businesses will
not want to bother with it. Id.
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20benefit consumers. 03 Only large telecommunications companies have
the ability to improve the industry and offer the services that consumers
demand.20 4 If Congress wants to ensure that competition will flourish in
the industry, spectrum caps can be used to prevent over-consolidation.
20 5
If Congress determines that promoting small businesses is still a
desirable goal for the industry, then the FCC needs to restructure its
auction system.206 The FCC could create a system where the small
businesses focus on providing services in rural areas, which are being
ignored and under-serviced currently.20 7  Furthermore, the small
businesses could partner up with the larger national providers and




203. See generally, Cramton, supra note 128; Hazlett, supra note 16.
204. See generally, Cramton, supra note 128.
205. Id.
206. See Brief of Amici Curiae Airadigm Communications, Inc. at 1, FCC v. NextWave, 537
U.S. 293 (Nos. 01-653, 01-657).
207. See generally, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-Based Services to Rural Areas and
Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to Provide Spectrum-Based Services, 68
Fed. Reg. at 64,050 (Nov..12, 2003)(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 22, 24, 90).
208. See, U.S. Department of Transportation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, Wireless
Telecommunications Carrier Industry Overview (March 2001), at http://www.its.
dot.gov/51 1/PDF/Wireless Telecom.pdf. See generally, Facilitating the Provision of Spectrum-
Based Services to Rural Areas and Promoting Opportunities for Rural Telephone Companies to
Provide Spectrum-Based Services, 68 Fed. Reg. at 64,050 (Nov. 12, 2003)(to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pt. 22, 24, 90).
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